Abstract
Introduction
In theory, the debt overhang hypothesis asserts that public debt servicing depresses economic growth via a multiplier accelerator effect through various mechanisms: (1) it drives up domestic interest rates, thereby increasing the cost of borrowing, which then crowds out private sector investment; (2) it causes a net flow outwards of domestic resources (comprising of external grants, aid and foreign exchange resources) in the form of foreign public debt repayments; (3) it presents future tax uncertainty and a deterioration in domestic policies, which directly impact on real returns on investment; (4) it increases government participation in domestic capital and money markets, which can then lead to credit rationing; and (5) it increases the government's appetite to borrow so as to service its debts, among other reasons (Clements, Bhattacharya and Nguyen 2003; Krugman 1989; Metwally and Tamaschke 1994; Patenio and Tan-Cruz 2007; Sachs 1989 ).
However, the results of empirical research by Chowdhury (1994) , Elbadawi, Benno, and Njuguna (1996); Fosu (1999) , and Pattillo, Poirson and Ricci (2004) , among others, reveal that there is no evidence supporting the negative linkage between public debt servicing and growth in studied countries. These contradictory results indicate that there are some systematic variations in the cost of public debt servicing across countries, varying also over time. Extending the discussion to Zambia will assist the country in its debt service management and in policy formulation, given the drive by state authorities to transform the country into a prosperous upper middle-income country by 2030.
Historically, the evolution of the Zambian public debt has been a result of sagging world copper prices in the mid-1970s until the late 1990s, which caused substantial decline in both economic growth rates and central government revenues from mineral taxation and exports (McCulloch, et al., 2000) . The persistent rise in (i) budget deficits (see Appendix), (ii) domestic and international interest rates on debt, and (iii) rolling over of domestic public debt between 1975 and 1991 made Zambia one of the highly indebted poor countries in sub-Saharan Africa (Thurlow and Wobst 2006; McCulloch et al., 2000) . The high public debt stocks (domestic and foreign) translated into unsustainable public debt service obligations.
Consequentially, the huge budget outlays towards public debt servicing in Zambia had been perceived as one of the hurdles to the country's economic growth process and also to poverty alleviation (Government of the Republic of Zambia " GRZ" 2008) . Regrettably, the high domestic public debt service payments were not being transformed into productive uses by the recipients; thus, these allocations were an impediment to sustainable economic growth and development in Zambia (Bigsten and KayizziMugerwa 2000) . Of much concern is the fact that between 2007 and 2014, national budget allocations for Zambia's domestic public debt servicing have consistently been rising relative to those allocated for new capital spending (Southern African Development Community "SADC" 2015).
Against this background, the aim of this study is to analyse the evolution of government debt servicing in Zambia since 1964 by highlighting debt service trends, reforms and challenges. The paper attempts to examine the heavy burden that government debt imposes on the country's development prospects. The rest of the paper is arranged as follows:
Section 2 presents an overview of the Zambian economy; Section 3 discusses the trends in public debt service in Zambia; while Section 4 reviews the public debt service reforms in Zambia. Finally, Section 5 discusses the challenges facing public debt service management in Zambia and Section 6 concludes the paper.
Overview of the Zambian economy
Since the early 1900s, the Zambian economic performance has been largely concentrated in two economic sectors: mining (mostly copper) and agriculture (mostly maize and tobacco). While the mining sector is predominantly capital-intensive, using modern technology, the agricultural sector is principally labour-intensive, using traditional methods (United Nations 2016). According to the United Nations (2016), construction and transport industries have since 2010 also been characterised by capitalintensive production methods and their contribution to the country's economic growth has been on the rise. Generally, the economy of Zambia is heavily dependent on copper mining, which accounts for over 70% of the country's total export earnings, but employing less than 2% of the population (Central Statistical Office "CSO" 2016) . Unemployment and underemployment rates in Zambia stood at 7.9% and 10.2% as at end of 2015, with the highest proportions of people employed in the agriculture, forestry and fisheries industries (World Bank 2016).
As of 2015, the Zambian economy was considered one of the fastestgrowing economy in sub-Saharan Africa, characterised by robust economic growth rates averaging 6.9% between 2005 and 2015, driven mainly by unprecedented high commodity prices (GRZ 2017) . With a per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of around US$ 1,700 in 2015, Zambia is now a lower-middle-income country (World Bank 2016). However, a combination of declining world mineral prices, particularly of raw copper, and inadequate production and supply of industrial enablers such as electricity, lowered the economic growth rates of Zambia beginning 2015, which recorded a 2.9% growth rate relative to 7.6% in 2012 (GRZ 2017). Inflation in Zambia averaged 11.4% and 9.9% between the periods -2009 , respectively (GRZ 2017 . Following the slump in world commodity prices by the end of 2014, the fiscal deficit of Zambia worsened, increasing from 2.4% of GDP in 2011 to 9.4% of GDP in 2015, thus necessitating increased public borrowing, both domestic and foreign, to fund expansionary fiscal policies (World Bank 2016).
Trends in public debt servicing in Zambia
The huge stock of government debt, public and publicly guaranteed, in Zambia since the 1970s brought about solemn implications for the country's debt servicing obligations and general economic performance as it directly affected credit creation, national gross savings, national gross investment, and central government gross revenue performances (Clements, Bhattacharya and Nguyen 2003) . The active presence of the government in the domestic capital markets in the early 1990s, in addition to foreign borrowing, not only affected domestic interest rates and also crowded out investments, but also brought about severe tax reforms to raise revenue for debt servicing (Clements, Bhattacharya and Nguyen 2003) . According to Atique and Malik (2012) and Tasos (2014), a high public sector debt service obligation reduces the private sector incentive to invest, which leads to negative economic growth. Zambia as signified by the persistent fall in public debt service-to-exports of goods and services ratio. As manifested in Figure 1 , between 1991 and 1994, the ratios of public debt service-to-GNI, public debt service-toexports of goods and services, and public debt service-to-revenue were at their worst in the country's history --and so was economic performance (GRZ 2006b ). While Figure 1 shows a lower public debt service-to-GNI and public debt service-to-export of goods and services ratios between 1987
and 1990, scheduled debt service was actually much higher (World Bank 2015). The government's policy of putting a ceiling on foreign public debt servicing contributed to the noticeable fall in the debt service ratios between 1987 and 1990 (World Bank 1993 .
During the period of 1985 to 1996, Zambia's average annual growth rate was 0.29% (World Bank 2012). The observable spikes in 1991, 1994 and 2003 in Figure 1 are a result of drastic shifts in political regimes (1991 and 2003) and of substantial economic and financial structural reforms (1991, 1994 and 2003) . These years, 1991 These years, , 1994 These years, and 2003 , are associated with the lowest growth rates of the period, that is, -0.04%, -8.63%, and 3.3%, respectively (World Bank 2012).
Phase two, 2005-2015, is characterised with considerable reductions in public debt stock owing to the debt relief initiatives that started in 2000.
As indicated in Figure 1 , the period is associated with declining public debt servicing ratios. The reduction in public debt service burden after 2000, especially on foreign public debt, boosted public savings and investment prompting increased physical infrastructure and human capital development, which then led to an economic rebound beginning
2006 (Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa 2000) . During this phase, economic growth and inflation averaged 6.9% and 10.6%, respectively, and the fiscal position of the country improved significantly (GRZ 2017).
Also depicted in Figure 1 is the new twist of public debt service ratios, which began trending upwards after 2012 due to renewed domestic and foreign public borrowing, debt roll-over and gradual deterioration in international copper prices (United Nations 2016). Consequentially, Zambia's risk of foreign public debt service distress, according to the IMF debt sustainability analysis, changed from low to moderate after 2012 (IMF 2015) . Consequently, phase three provides a futuristic outlook of Zambia's public debt service burden, which is expected to be increasing with the level of the country's output by 2020 (IMF 2014a). As government indebtedness increases, possibilities are that Zambia's public debt service commitments after 2020 will be financed by distortionary means (like seigniorage), especially if existing gross national investments fail to yield meaningful returns (IMF 2014b) . Moreover, although all of Zambia's public debt sustainability indicators are expected to remain below the IMF and World Bank applicable thresholds until 2020, the public debt service-to-government revenue ratio is expected to exceed the 18% IMF/ International Development Association baseline threshold (IMF 2015) . Table 1 and Table 2 provide a comparison of Zambia's foreign public debt service payments in the pre-and post-Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) periods. In essence, it can be construed from Table 2 that the HIPC and Multilateral Debt Relief (MDR) initiatives generated huge savings for Zambia through a reduction in foreign public debt servicing commitments. depressed copper prices and de-industrialisation, unredeemed public debt securities were recapitalised at the going high market interest rates, thus worsening the debt levels and repayment ability of the government.
In terms of foreign debt service payments' composition, half of the money was going towards interest payments while the remaining small balance was channelled towards principal debt repayment (Copestake and Weston 2000) . Following the debt relief and subsequent economic recovery, Table 1 assesses the foreign debt burden and debt sustainability of Zambia in the post debt-relief era --the bigger the ratio, the higher the debt problem. 
Source: African Statistical Yearbook (various editions), Central Statistics Office (CSO) (various issues), Bank of Zambia Annual Reports (various years)
The foreign public debt relief initiatives extended to Zambia by its traditional creditors eliminated the country's public debt service distress by 2006, and both foreign debt to-GDP and foreign debt service-to-exports ratios fell to within baseline thresholds. The proportion of the country's export revenues committed to foreign debt service was reduced from 11.2% in 2005 to 1.9% in 2010, as shown in Table 3 , thus widening Zambia's fiscal space.
As revealed in Table 3 , Zambia's debt sustainability ratios since 2006 fell to within indicative thresholds, meaning that the country could no longer qualify for additional debt relief under MDR initiative.
More so, the debt and financial crises in Zambia's major creditor economies, and the subsequent implementation of austerity measures by these countries, contributed to the reduction in new debt flows to Zambia, leading to marginal decrease in foreign public debt-to-GDP ratio in 2010, as revealed in Table 3 With a foreign public debt to GDP ratio of 38.7% in 2015, as indicated in Table 3 , relative to the 40% indicative threshold of the IMF/World Bank; and a combination of (1) 
Public debt servicing reforms in Zambia
The high government debt in Zambia -both domestic and foreignprior to the debt reliefs, directly implied massive debt service obligations for the country. Zambia's exceptionally high government debt service costs emanated from soaring domestic and foreign interest rates, poor performance of the domestic economy, frequent debt rescheduling at commercial rates by creditors, and the capitalisation of non-liquidated service obligations at commercial rates (Andersson, Bigsten and Persson 2000) . By the late 1970s, Zambia was already in a serious foreign debt service trap, which prompted the government to undertake debt service reforms.
In 1973, 1976, and 1978 Upon realising that the adopted reforms were not reducing the debt servicing obligation of the country and that the foreign payments were drawing substantially on scarce financial resources that otherwise could be used to advance national developmental programmes, the Zambian government revised its financial, structural, and economic reforms.
Consequently, in 1987, the country adopted regulatory policies as evidenced by the implementation of a 10% ceiling on foreign public debt payments in a move meant to tame resource outflow (Bigsten and KayizziMugerwa 2000) . Even though the country's economic performance partially improved and stabilised, this 10% foreign public debt servicing restriction policy caused Zambia to be isolated economically as most creditors substantially reduced the flow of foreign aid and other forms of support to the country (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2011).
In 1990, the Zambian government implemented a policy which set a limit on foreign public borrowing, in addition to adopting IMF-supported structural adjustment measures. These IMF measures came as a result of Zambia's arrears in servicing its debts to the institution. To resume foreign public debt servicing, particularly to the IMF, the country subscribed to the IMF's "rights accumulation programme" initiative, which stipulated The domestic public debt service reforms in Zambia comprised major shifts in fiscal and monetary policies along with structural and institutional reforms. The prime objective of these policy shifts was to reduce government expenditures and mobilise more financial resources to service both domestic and foreign debts (GRZ 2006b; Chileshe and Kafula 2015) .
Following the abrupt depreciation of the exchange rate due to reduced export earnings caused by the waning in commodity prices, and the subsequent economic decline, the government in 1987 disregarded the foreign exchange auction system and revalued its local currency (Bank of Zambia "BOZ" 2012, Chirwa and Odhiambo 2016) .
In response to the high domestic public service costs in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the government turned to seigniorage and instituted the Public Service Reform Programme, which resulted in the restructuring of state enterprises. During the period 1988 and 1993, for instance, the average annual inflation of Zambia was 143%, with a peak of 186% recorded in
(World Bank 2003).
In 1993, the government adopted a cash budget system in which cash was released to line ministries only if adequate funds were available in the government's main bank accounts to meet the required payments; and the government also began to redeem its local debt with the assistance of an increased proportion of concessional foreign borrowing (World Bank 1993; GRZ 2006c) . In 2014, the government reintroduced the cash budget system in which government ministries and arms' expenditure were supposed to be limited to the disbursed funds (GRZ 2013).
Challenges facing public debt servicing in Zambia In the first episode, the country was facing high debt servicing costs emanating from both huge non-concessionary debts and high interest rates. In the second episode, the debt service costs of Zambia decreased radically following the HIPC and MDR debt relief initiatives and also owing to high economic growth rates. The third phase provided an overview of Zambia's future debt service sustainability. In this third phase, the paper revealed that, if the government fails to expand its revenue base by diversifying the economy, the country is likely to face liquidity and solvency challenges. Among the discussed debt-service reforms, there were exchange rate policy changes, economic structural adjustment policies, and active engagement of the international creditor community through contractual agreements. The paper further revealed that the country's major debt service challenges emanated from, among other things, a narrow government revenue base, high and volatile interest rates, and exceptionally high government debt stocks. Going forward, the paper recommends that the government of Zambia (1) embarks on stringent austerity measures that limit both domestic and foreign public borrowing, so as to curb the accumulation of high interest payments on public debt; and (2) improves its fiscal position, by aligning public sector infrastructural spending with revenues to ensure budgetary sustainability;
and (3) continues with the diversification of the economy so as to minimise the impact of external shocks, particularly in terms of rampant fluctuations in world commodity prices. 
